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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCE CLAUSE - LABOR LAW - POWER
OF STATE TO ENJOIN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYEES IN INDUSTRIES ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE The appellant ( defendant in
the case below) and certain of its members were found guilty of unfair labor
practices as defined by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Act.1 Plaintiffappellee issued a cease and desist order, which was sustained by the lower court
despite defendant's contention that the statute was unconstitutional on the
ground that Congress had precluded such state legislation affecting interstate
industries by enacting the National Labor Relations Act.2 Held, plaintiff's order
sustained. State legislation not repugnant to the Wagner Act is operative in
this field so long as the National Labor Relations Board has not acted in the
particular matter. Allen-Bradley Local No. I II 1, United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America 'lJ. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
(Wis., 1941) 295 N. W. 791.
In the absence of federal legislation, it would seem that state supervision of
labor relations in industries engaging in interstate commerce would be upheld
despite any negative implications of the commerce clause.8 The states have a
legitimate interest in averting industrial strife and, therefore, in the exercise of
their police powers may enact statutes similar to that in the principal case. That
Congress may preclude state legislation affecting interstate commerce by enacting affirmative legislation has been uncontroverted since Gibbons 'lJ. 0 gden."
The difficulty arises in determining when and under what circumstances federal
statutes can be deemed to have precluded further state action in this field. The
cases involving regulation of interstate railroad carriers indicate a tendency of
the United States Supreme Court readily to find supersession of state regulation
on the ground that Congress by entering the field has intended to exclude the
states, or because state statutes with different provisions are deemed inconsistent.5
1

Wis. Stat. ( 1939), § I II.01 et seq.
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 151 et seq.
8 U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8. For a survey of the several theories adopted by
the Supreme Court when dealing with this problem, see: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
(22 U.S.) 1 (1824); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827); Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 245 (1829); License Cases,
5 How. (46 U. S.) 504 (1847); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (53 U. S.)
299 ( I 85 I). See also, Dowling, "Interstate Commerce and State Power," 27 VA.
L. REV. I (1940).
"9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 1 (1824).
5
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington ex rel. Atkinson, 222 U. S. 370, 32 S. Ct.
160 (19II); Erie Ry. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671, 34 S. Ct. 756 (1914), hours of
service regulation; Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 32 S. Ct. 140 (1911), state
law repugnant to federal rate publication provision. To the effect that there can be no
divided authority over interstate commerce and that the regulations of Congress are
supreme: Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426, 33
S. Ct. 174 (1912); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 45 S. Ct. 243
(1925); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 15 S. Ct. 802 (1894). See
also New York Central Ry. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 37 S. Ct. 546 (1916), employers liability legislation; Napier v. Atlantic Coastline Ry., 272 U. S. 605, 47 S.
Ct. 207 (1926), safety appliance acts. But in Atlantic Coastline Ry. v. Georgia, 234
U. S. 280, 34 S. Ct. 829 (1913), state specifications for locomotive headlights were
upheld although Congress had made various other prescriptions as to locomotive parts.
2
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State enactments adopting quarantine and inspection measures against goods imported through interstate channels have been received more favorably by the
Court despite the existence of similar federal statutes.6 Statutes whose objects
were highway safety and upkeep, 7 prescription of tobacco warehouse rates,8
and control of "bucket shops" 9 have also been upheld notwithstanding pertinent
Congressional action. Because of the widely different state and federal laws
involved, an attempt to test the decision in the principal case by previous holdings
is necessarily hazardous, for each decision may properly be limited to its own
facts. A line of cases holding that Congressional delegation of power to administrative bodies, unaccompanied by affirmative action by the commissions, does
not displace state legislation 10 gives some authority for the position taken by the
Wisconsin court. The contention that the National Labor Relations Act is not
self-executing and that an order of the N. L. R. B. is required to oust the states
appears in two decisions dealing with unfair labor practices by employers.11
This proposition may well be adopted by the Supreme Court to sustain the constitutionality of state labor relations statutes, for, in the past, the Court has been
reluctant to strike down state legislation bearing directly upon the public welfare
of the state and having the objective of resolving local problems, even though
necessarily affecting interstate commerce.12 The Wisconsin statute, designed to
avert the violence of industrial strife, would seem vitally related to the preserva6 Missouri K. & T. R. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 S. Ct. 488 (1897);
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 28 S. Ct. 485 (1907); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S.
137, 23 S. Ct. 92 (1902); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 53 S. Ct. 6u (1933),
affirming (D. C. N. Y. 1933) 2 F. Supp. 700. Somewhat akin to this type of regulation are statutes designed to promote purity and quality of food. Regulation of this
type was upheld in Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189, 24 S. Ct. 234 (1903};
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S. Ct. 715 (19n).
7 Thompson v. McDonald, (C. C. A. 5th, 1938} 95 F. (2d) 937; Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, 60 S. Ct. 726 (1939),
8 Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 57 S. Ct. 842 (1936).
9 Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U. S. 188, 53 S. Ct. 362 (1933).
19 Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee Flour Mills, 2II U. S. 612, 29 S. Ct. 214
(1908); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133, 51 S. Ct. 65 (1930);
Board of Railroad Commissioners of North Dakota v. Great Northern Ry., 281
U.S. 412, 50 S. Ct. 391 (1930); Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Nebraska State
Railway Commission, 297 U. S. 471, 56 S. Ct. 536 (1936), Contra: OregonWashington Railway and Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87, 46 S. Ct.
279 (1926).
11 Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., 228 Wis,
473, 279 N. W. 673 (1938); Davega City Radio v. State Labor Relations Board,
281 N. Y. 13, 22 N. E. (2d) 145 (1939). The two statutes involved in these cases
in so far as they deal with unfair labor practices by employers are substantially identical.
Wis. Stat. (1939), § 111.01 et seq.; N. Y. Laws (1937), c. 443. The Wisconsin
statute is the one challenged in the principal case.
12 See note 6, supra. ''The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by
the State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action,
is superseded only wp.ere the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the
two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together.'" Kelly v. Washington ex
rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. l at 10, 58 S. Ct. 87 {1937).
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tion of local social tranquility and an exercise of the police power of peculiar
importance to the local citizenry. It is to be noted that the section of the statute
challenged in the case at bar proscribes unfair labor practices by employees.18
Restriction of the National Labor Act to unfair practices of employers gives
life to the argument that Congress preferred to leave the states free to cope with
the employee side of the problem.14 The decision in the principal case permits
the state to mitigate labor strife in all its industries and at the same time acknowledges the power of the N. L. R. B. by its orders to supersede this regulation
and deal with the particular dispute along lines of national policy.111 This result
seems especially desirable when one considers that the N. L. R. B. cannot intervene in labor disputes except upon the charge of an aggrieved party•18
18 Wis. Stat. (1939), § I 11.06. Wisconsin alone among states legislating in the
labor relations field defines unfair labor practices by employees. For other state statutes,
see note l 6, infra.
16 "The case calls for the application of the well-established principle that Congress
may circumscribe its regulation and occupy a limited field, and that the intent to
supersede the exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not covered by the
federal legislation is not to implied unless the latter fairly interpreted is in actual
conffict with the state law." Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441 at 454, 57 S. Ct.
842 (1936). The Wisconsin statute in its terms is not conflicting with the provisions
and policy set forth in the Wagner Act. Its similarity leads to the inference that it
was modeled after the federal statute. For such minor variations as exist, see Garrison,
"Government and Labor: The Latest Phase," 37 CoL. L. REv. 897 (1937). The
National Labor Relations Act does not protect sit-down strikers from amenability to
state laws. National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S.
240, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939).
111 A strong policy argument for permitting state collective bargaining statutes to
co-exist with the Wagner Act, and for amending the federal act to this end, is made
by Garrison in "Government and Labor: The Latest Phase," 37 CoL. L. REV. 897
(1937). Three states and Puerto Rico have adopted collective bargaining statutes very
similar to those adopted by New York and Wisconsin. Utah Laws (1937), c. 55; Mass.
Acts (1938), c. 345; Pa. Stat. (Purdon, Supp. 1940), tit. 43, § 2II.I et seq.;
Porto Rico Laws (1938), No. 143. The Pennsylvania statute in defining "employer'' (§
3c) excludes those persons subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. The Massachusetts act (§ 10b) expressly states that it shall not extend to unfair
labor practices covered by the national act.

18 49 Stat. L. 453, § IO, 29 U. S. C. (1934), § 160. This section of the act
provides that the National Labor Relations Board is to have exclusive jurisdiction to
carry out the purposes of the act. The following interpretation is given to this provision by the Wisconsin court: "This section purports to deal not with the scope of
the act, but with the powers and jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
with respect to its administration. Its purpose is therefore presumably to establish the
exclusive character of the board's powers of administration as contrasted with other
federal boards and agencies which might otherwise be thought to have like jurisdiction."
Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., 228 Wis. 473 at
4-83, 279 N. W. 673 (1938).

